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Author: Zach Paterick

Private Equity and the Leveraged Buyout: Taking a Public Company Private

Posted on April 11, 2013September 24, 2013 by Zach Paterick

What is a Leveraged buyout?

A leveraged buyout (LBO) is a form of a business acquisition. However, it differs from an ordinary merger and acquisition (M&A) deal in many ways. First, the acquirer in an LBO is not a traditional corporation as in other acquisitions. Instead, the acquirer is a newly formed non-operating company, made up of the private equity firm and often the party who will manage the daily activities of the business.

Additionally, LBO’s are heavily debt financed, often with as little as 10 to 20% of the purchase price coming from equity investment.[1] In order to secure the large amount of debt necessary to complete the deal, the non-operating company is forced to borrow against the physical assets of the acquired business.[2]

Once the terms of the LBO are agreed to, current shareholders will be compensated with an agreed upon per share price and the ownership will be transferred to the non-operating company (the private equity firm and all other investors).

Why take a company private through an LBO?

Private equity firms are motivated to take the targeted company private in order to unlock potential synergy gains[3]. These synergy gains might come from financial restructuring, change in control, or increased coordination in decision-making.[4]

Firms often create synergy gains through financial restructuring. As discussed before, leveraged buyouts involve heavy debt financing. Debt has a tax benefit not available from equity investment, in that the interest owed on current outstanding debt decreases taxable income, resulting in higher cash flow available to all stakeholders.[5] In other words, debt creates a tax-shield equal to current interest expense multiplied by the effective tax rate.[6] Therefore, increasing the amount of debt within the financial structure of the firm can create value.

Additionally, Private equity firms often look to unlock synergy gains by eliminating the waste associated with inefficient management. By taking the company private, the firm no longer has to seek shareholder approval of management, but instead, can self select the new leadership team.[7] The idea is that the new management team will make better business decisions, increasing revenues and decreasing the associated costs.

Moreover, even if current management is efficiently running the company, there are coordination advantages from taking a company private. Public companies face a folly A/folly B problem. The company wants long-term success. In other words, it wants to make investments that result in the greatest net present value in the long run. However, companies have to respond to shareholders, who reward short-term performance, which results in increased stock price, over long term performance.

By taking the company private, management has flexibility in its decision-making and can focus on long-term performance without having to worry about shareholder repercussions. Also, public companies are often slow to act because there is a shareholder coordination problem. The company must provide information on major changes to all shareholders and must convince owners of a majority of the shares to vote collectively. By taking the company private, ownership is concentrated in a few individuals/entities who can act swiftly.

The potential downside of an LBO

While there are certainly numerous potential sources of synergy gains associated with an LBO, the form of acquisition is not without its risks. When levering a company to such a high debt to equity (D/E) ratio, the company must be able to produce enough cash flow to make its periodic interest payments on the outstanding debt. As a result, the risk of bankruptcy increases and the possibility of receiving the tax shield decreases. Additionally, banks will require higher returns to compensate for the risk associated with the debt. Therefore, private equity firms partaking in LBOs are continuously confronting the issue of how much leverage to implement in the deal.

Additionally, in an LBO, there is a constant conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Shareholders are incentivized to take risk, whereas bondholders prefer sound investments that will allow the company to pay back its debt. Therefore, when securing debt, private equity firms might lose some financial flexibility due to bank-imposed constraints on spending. If not managed properly this can counteract some of the benefits associated with making the move to a private company.

Lastly, by taking a company private, the investors lose access to a liquid market. As a result, it may take longer to recoup the investment. Research has indicated that the median LBO is still in private equity ownership around 9 years after the initial buyout transaction.[8]

Who is a good LBO target?

Given the potential risks associated with an LBO transaction, private equity firms must be careful when deciding whom to target. Private equity firms should look at targets from a three-value driver perspective: leverage, change in control and private-public.[9] The ideal target should be underlevered, inefficiently managed, and should be incurring large costs from staying public.[10] Additionally, companies with large assets and stable free cash-flows (cash cows) can support more debt, making them an attractive target. At the same time, private equity firms want to avoid using an LBO to purchase companies in highly cyclical industries and industries with rapid product obsolescence.[11] Companies in these industries are prone to periods of low to negative free cash-flows, which in turn increases the probability that they will be unable to meet their debts as they come due.

Summary

LBO’s are a form of private equity acquisition, in which the investors form a non-operating company and purchase a public company by implementing primarily debt financing. Taking a public company private can create gains in a multitude of ways, including increased tax shield free cash flows, elimination of inefficient management, and increased coordination of decision making. At the same time, there are many risks associated with an LBO. The risk of bankruptcy increases immensely, resulting in higher lending rates and loss of some financial flexibility. Consequently, private equity firms must be strategic about when to implement an LBO acquisition and realize that it is not always the proper tool.

__________________________________________________________
[1] Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Associate Professor of Finance, Valuation course at the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan (February, 2013); Note on Leveraged Buyouts. Center For Private Equity and Entrepreneurship at 1, available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/LBO_Note.pdf.

[2] Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association 23(1), 2009.

[3] Here, synergy gain is a proxy for a long term financial benefit

[4] See Note on Leveraged Buyouts at 2.

[5] Grant Houston, Tax Advantages of a Leveraged Buyout, Chron, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-advantages-leveraged-buyout-24006.html

[6] See id.

[7] Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Associate Professor of Finance, Valuation course at the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan (February, 2013).

[8] See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 130.

[9] Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Associate Professor of Finance, Valuation course at the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan (February, 2013).

[10] Id.

[11] Id..

Re-defining the Line between Public and Private

Posted on October 23, 2012July 29, 2013 by Zach Paterick

In his new article, Revisiting “Truth in Securities Revisited”: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, Adam Pritchard argues that the current transition between private and public company status is awkward and inefficient.[1] Pritchard suggests that these inefficiencies can be reduced through the implementation of a two-tier market system for transitioning from private to public status.[2] In this blog, I analyze the implications of Pritchard’s suggested system on the Private Equity Community.

Background

Pritchard argues that the separate enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act created a mismatched dividing line between public and private status.[3] The Securities Act draws the line in a manner that focuses explicitly on investor protection, while the dividing line under the Exchange Act reflects the attempt to balance investor protection, interests in capital formation, and practical ease of application.[4] Congress has shifted the point at which companies must go public through the JOBS Act, which gave the SEC new authority to exempt offerings from the requirements for registered offerings and authorized the SEC to adopt less demanding periodic disclosure from companies who benefit from this new offering exemption.[5] Pritchard contends that the JOBS Act reforms have the potential to create a lower tier of public companies and to blur the line between private and public companies.[6]

The Two-Tier System

Pritchard offers a different solution; one he believes unifies the public/private dividing line under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Pritchard’s solution involves a two-tier market for both primary and secondary transactions, where the primary market would be limited to accredited investors, while the public market would be accessible to all.[7] Under this regime, all public offerings would be seasoned offerings with a price informed both by full disclosure and a pre-existing trading market. Issuers would be able to choose whether to sell in the primary or secondary market and companies would become eligible for the primary market after reaching a certain quantitative benchmark (he suggests $75 million in market capitalization, the threshold currently used by the SEC for shelf registration).[8]

Under this system, issuers below the quantitative benchmark would be limited to selling their securities to accredited investors. However, contrary to the current system, those securities could not be freely resold after a minimum holding period, but would instead be sold to other accredited investors on an established secondary market (similar to SecondMarket or SharesPost except expanding eligible purchasers from Qualified Institutional Buyers to all accredited investors).[9]

Elevation to the public market would be completely voluntary.[10] Issuers unable or unwilling to meet the obligations associated with access to the public market would be allowed to remain private. Once a company chose to go public, a seasoning period would follow with the filing of requisite 10-Q’s during which the shares would continue to be traded in the private market.[11] This seasoning period would allow the trading price in the public market to be informed by the prior trading in the private market as well as the new information required to initiate the “going public” process.[12] Only after the company graduated to having its shares traded in the public market would the company be free to sell equity to public investors.[13] This two-tier system relies on the pricing efficiency of the markets.

Impact on Private Equity

Pritchard’s suggested model would impact the private equity market in multiple dimensions. First, companies looking for late stage investment to expand their brand could continue to seek private capital, without having to cross the public divide. Consequently, the amount of firms seeking private equity would likely expand, creating more opportunities for private investment.

Additionally, Pritchard’s plan would essentially create a liquid market for private equity investors. While similar markets already exist, see SecondMarket and SharesPost, these markets are limited to “qualified institutional buyers” (investors with more than $100 million under management). Pritchard’s secondary markets would include accredited investors, individuals with at least $200,000 in annual income or $1 million in assets. This increased participation in the secondary market would allow the market to establish a trading price.

Lastly, Pritchard’s plan would eliminate the need for marketers to create demand when a firm decides to go public. Instead, the secondary market, supplemented by the required filings to go public, would establish a trading price. The underpricing dilemma of IPOs would essentially disappear. Thus, private equity holders participating in the company’s transition from private to public would receive greater returns.

In summary, Pritchard’s two-tier market plan would create new opportunities for private equity investment, create a liquid trading platform, and help ensure that investors exiting the market when a firm elects to go public receive proper returns. Such a market system would be advantageous to private equity investors; it should be given serious consideration.

________________________________________
[1] Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities Revisited”: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good (University of Michigan Law & Econ Research, Paper No. 12-010, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103246 .

[2] See id. at 5.

[3] Id. at 3.

[4] Id.

[5] See Revisiting “Truth in Securities Revisited” at 4.

[6] Id.

[7] See id. at 30.

[8] See id.

[9] See id. at 31.

[10] Id. at 33.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 34.

[13] See id.

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